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NATURAL DEDUCTION 
AS HIGHER-ORDER RESOLUTION 
LAWRENCE C. PAULSON 
D An interactive theorem prover, Isabelle, is under development. In LCF, each 
inference rule is represented by one function for forwards proof and 
another (a tactic) for backwards proof. In Isabelle, each inference rule is 
represented by a Horn clause. Resolution gives both forwards and back- 
wards proof, supporting a large class of logics. Isabelle has been used to 
prove theorems in Martin-Lofs constructive type theory. Quantifiers pose 
several difficulties: substitution, bound variables, Skolemization. Isabelle’s 
representation of logical syntax is the typed X-calculus, requiring higher- 
order unification. It may have potential for logic programming. Depth-first 
subgoaling along inference rules constitutes a higher-order PROLOG. a 
1. BACKGROUND 
At least seven interactive theorem provers use the LCF framework. They differ 
primarily in what logic is used for conducting proofs. A new theorem prover, 
Isabelle, is intended to unify these diverging paths. 
A recurring theme will be the relationship between syntax and semantics. We 
compute by means of syntax but think in terms of semantics. A system of inference 
rules is a syntactic codification of semantic concepts, and must be shown to respect 
them. Sets and functions are semantic; formal type theories and Zermelo-Fraenkel 
set theory are syntactic. The ultimate semanticnotion is truth, faintly approximated 
by theorems of formal logic. Regarding an axiom system as holy writ blurs the 
distinction. Martin-Lof [22] discusses the evolution of formal logic from an intui- 
tionistic viewpoint. There are many distinct semantic viewpoints, and accordingly 
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many formal systems. A universal ogic is too much to hope for. However, we all 
seem to write down formal proofs in the same way: by joining inference rules 
together. 
Isabelle evolved by trial and error from implementations of Martin-Lof’s con- 
structive theory of types. I started with ML and the LCF architecture, as described in 
the next section. Attempts to put un$cution into LCF pushed theorems from the 
dominant position, focusing attention on inference rules. Quantifiers posed an 
endless series of problems. Martin-LX s syntactic theory of expressions, akin to the 
typed X-calculus, gave a uniform framework for bound variables and substitution. 
This required higher-order unification, in general undecidable; the literature offered 
little practical advice. Quantifiers also introduced dependencies between variables in 
the proof, requiring some form of Skolemization. 
As an example, the rules of Martin-Lof s constructive type theory have been put 
into Isabelle, with appropriate tactics. The types of many constructions can be 
inferred automatically; simple functions can be derived interactively. 
2. THE LCP INTERACTIVE THEOREM PROVER 
Edinburgh LCF introduced a new approach to theorem proving: embed the formal 
logic in a programmable metalanguage, ML [15]. Terms and formulas are values in 
ML: they have an explicit tree structure and can be decomposed and built up by ML 
functions. Theorems are values of an abstract data type thm. In place of arbitrary 
constructor functions, inference rules map theorems to theorems. This is forwards 
proof. For backwards proof, goals, subgoals, and tactics are implemented on top of 
this abstract type. Each rule checks that it has received suitable premises, then 
generates the conclusion. Each tactic checks that it has received a suitable goal, then 
generates the subgoals giving the corresponding rule as validation. Milner [27] 
explains rules and tactics, while Gordon [12] works out the representation of a 
simple logic in ML. 
Recent LCF proofs involve denotational semantics, verification of functional 
programs, and verification of digital circuits [30]. Logics include two versions of PPA 
(for domain theory) [15, 311, a logic for sequential machines, two higher-order logics 
[8, 131, and two constructive type theories [9, 321. Implementing a logic is a major 
undertaking: choosing a representation of formulas, implementing several dozen 
inference rules and tactics, implementing many more derived rules and higher-level 
tools, implementing a theory database, writing a parser and printer, and document- 
ing all these things. 
2.1. Forwards Proof and Inference Rules 
Znference rules are functions from theorems to theorems; axioms are built-in 
theorems of an LCF theory. Theorems can only be created by applying inference 
rules to axioms and other theorems. The logic of Cambridge LCF is PPX, for 
reasoning in domain theory. The axiom of reflexivity for the partial ordering g is 
k Vx. x c x, which is bound to the ML identifier LESS REFL of type thm. The rule - 
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of conjunction introduction, 
l-tA AtB 
I’,AI-AAB ’ 
is bound to the ML identifier CONJ of type thm + thm * thm. 
In natural deduction, each theorem is proved with respect to a set of assump- 
tions. Conventional textbooks [38] treat the assumptions as leaves of the proof tree; 
when the assumption is discharged, the leaf is crossed out. LCF attaches the 
assumptions directly to the theorem, resulting in a sort of sequent calculus. The 
conjunction rule states that if the premises are t A and F B with assumptions I 
and A, then the conclusion is I- A A B under the union I, A of those assumptions. 
The incorrect use of a rule is rejected using ML’s exception mechanism: a function 
can faif instead of returning a result. The conjunction elimination rules are 
rtAr\B rkAAB 
rl-A ’ ra . 
They are implemented by ML functions of type thm - thm that fail if the argument 
is not a conjunction. Modus ponens, or implication elimination, is 
rtA-B AI-A 
The function MP checks that its first argument has the form F A = B and that its 
second argument is I- A. If either condition is violated, MP fails. 
Disjunction introduction raises a question. What if the conclusion contains 
formulas not in the premises? 
I-t-A 
rtAvB’ 
In LCF, the formula B is supplied as an extra argument. The ML function DISJZ has 
type thm + form + thm. 
Implication introduction is also called the discharge rule. It discharges a formula 
from the set of assumptions, forming an implication: 
r,AtB 
rtA-B’ 
The assumption A is an extra argument; DISCH has type form + thm + thm. 
Notation: I, A abbreviates I? U {A}; the order of assumptions does not matter in 
classical first-order logic. 
2.2. Quantifiers 
Quantifiers bring in several concepts: substitution, bound variables, and parameters. 
A common convention for substitution writes the formula A as A[ t] to emphasize 
that it may have free occurrences of t. Then A[u] is the result after substituting u 
for those occurrences. 
In Vx.A[x], the variable x is bound. The name is immaterial: this formula is 
equivalent to Vy. A[y]. Naive substitution can change the meaning of a formula 
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because of clashes among variable names. LCF renames bound variables when 
necessary; the Lisp code to do this is dismayingly complex. 
A parameter stands for an arbitrary, fixed value in a proof,’ as when we say, 
“Let z be given.” LCF and many authors let any free variable serve as a parameter. 
Some authors regard parameters a, b,. . . as syntactically distinct from variables 
x,y,...; parameters cannot be bound, and theorems contain no free variables. To 
be “arbitrary,” a parameter must not appear in certain formulas. 
Consider the universal introduction rule. If the theorem F A[x] holds for 
arbitrary x, then !- Ay.A[ y] holds. “Arbitrary” means that the assumptions I? have 
no free occurrence of x: 
rtA[x] 
IV-Vy.A[y] ’ 
x not free in I. 
The restriction on the parameter x prevents contradictions such as 
x=OFx=O Assumption rule 
x=OFVy.y=O Incorrect use of V-introduction 
Fx=O*Vy.y=O * -introduction 
I- Vz.( z = 0 =I Vy. y = 0) V-introduction 
I-o=o*vy.y=o V-elimination with 0 
I-Vy.y=O j -elimination with 0 = 0 
tl=O V-elimination with 1 
In LCF, universal introduction is the function GEN of type term -+ thm + thm. Its 
first argument is the parameter x. If GEN finds an occurrence of x in the 
assumptions, then it fails. 
The existential introduction rule is ambiguous in forwards proof: 
rtA[t] 
W3x.A[x]’ 
Which occurrences of t should be replaced by x? The premise F 0 = 0 gives four 
different conclusions: 
I- 3x.x =x, t 3x.0 = x, t 3x.x = 0, t- 3x.0 = 0. 
To resolve the ambiguity, the function EXISTS takes two extra arguments: the 
term t and the formula stating the conclusion ilx.A[x]. 
2.3. Backwards Proof and Tactics 
At the lowest level LCF executes forwards proof, but it also supports backwards 
proof. The goal r < B expresses the desired theorem IY I- B. A tactic is a function 
that reduces a goal to a list of subgoals. The conjunction of the subgoals should 
imply the goal, so repeated use of tactics forms an AND tree of goals. In LCF, this 
‘This paper uses parameter only to mean this: never to mean an argument to a function. 
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top-down decomposition of the goal must be followed by a bottom-up reconstruc- 
tion of the proof. Tactics provide high-level assistance in the search for a proof, but 
a theorem can only be produced by executing the primitive inference rules. So each 
tactic returns a validation function. The validation ought to produce a theorem 
achieving the goal, given theorems achieving the subgoals. If it does not, the tactic is 
invalid, and can only lead the user down an incorrect path. We cannot be certain of 
the validations until they are applied, usually at the very end of the proof. 
In sum, a tactic maps a goal I ? B to the pair 
of subgoals and validation. Every tactic has the type 
goal + (( goal list ) X ( thm [ist + thm )) . 
For example, the tactic for conjunction introduction is called CONJ TAC. It 
maps any goal of the form I? $ A A B to the two-element goal list [ IY c 2, I? c B]. 
The validation, which calls the rule CONJ, maps the two-element theorem list 
[rkA,rt-Bltothetheorem TFAr\B. 
Constructing the validation is routine, but there is no uniform method because 
the rule may be a function taking extra arguments. The tactic for the discharge rule, 
DISCH_TAC, maps a goal I $ A * B to the one-element goal list [I, A c B]. It 
adds the antecedent, A, to the assumptions in the subgoal. The validation calls 
the rule DISCH, passing the extra argument A. The universal introduction tactic, 
GEN_TAC, maps a goal IY &Vx. A[x] to one subgoal I ?- A[x’], choosing the 
parameter x’ to differ from all the variables in the assumptions. The validation calls 
GEN, passing it x’. 
When a premise of a rule contains a term not in the conclusion, its tactic requires 
extra arguments to compute the subgoals. The tactic for existential introduction, 
E<ISTS_TAC, takes a term t asVan extra argument. EXISTS_TAC maps a goal 
l? k 3x. A[x] to the single goal I F A[t]. It attacks the goal “there exists an x” by 
stating “and that x is in fact t.” Unfortunately, the proper choice for t, the 
existential witness, may not be evident. A nice analogy has been mentioned: a 
program runs in order n2 time if it executes kn2 steps, for some constant k. A proof 
that it runs in order n2 time should contain enough information to deduce the value 
of k, but we will never find a proof if we have to guess k as the first step. 
3. PUTTING UNIFICATION INTO LCF 
The LCF tradition favors one-way matching over unification. An inference rule 
matches theorems of a given pattern; a tactic matches goals. However, some 
researchers have tried to bring the benefits of unification into LCF. 
Resolution tactics work on the goal’s assumptions, adding new assumptions. Most 
resolution tactics use one-way matching; Brian Monahan’s use unification [28]. 
Monahan has also automated the construction of simple rules and tactics. His 
function METARULE turns any theorem P, A . . . A P, - Q into the rule 
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P, * * - P, 
n . 
His METATAC produces the corresponding tactic. Their generality is 
limit% because LCF'S logic, PPX, does not have variables ranging over formulas. 
Stefan Sokolowski used Edinburgh LCF to prove the soundness of Hoare axiomatic 
rules with respect to a denotational semantics of a simple programming language 
[37]. The proof requires the systematic expansion of many definitions. LCF'S sim- 
plifier expands definitions by rewriting, but Sokolowski preferred to structure his 
proof in terms of derived inference rules. 
Sokolowski’s innovation was to allow pattern uariables in goals, and allow tactics 
to instantiate pattern variables by unification [36]. Existential goals are an obvious 
use for pattern variables. Sokolowski’s tactics could allow the existential witness to 
be inferred later in the proof.’ An environment holds instantiations of pattern 
variables. A unification tactic takes an environment as well as a goal. It returns an 
extended environment along with the subgoals and validation. After all subgoals 
have been solved, the validation is given the final environment as well as a list of 
theorems. 
Sokolowski extended Edinburgh LCF by writing unification tacticals and simple 
backtracking tactics in ML. There were problems. Edinburgh LCF executed ML 
slowly. The treatment of environments during sequential composition (the tactical 
THEN) may have been faulty. Each subgoal could instantiate the environment 
differently; if the environments were incompatible, then the proof would fail. I 
prefer to string a single environment hrough the subgoals. Even so, Sokolowski’s 
tactics verified the Hoare rules with remarkable clarity, capturing the high-level 
structure of the proofs. 
4. REASONING WITH INFERENCE RULES 
Schmidt argues that inference rules are more natural than axioms for goal-directed 
proof [34]. To illustrate the point, he develops natural deduction proof rules from 
axioms of Giidel-Bemays set theory. The subset relation c is defined by the axiom 
Reasoning directly from this axiom requires fiddling with many quantifiers and 
connectives. Schmidt’s subset introduction rule is the typical way to prove that A is 
a subset of B: 
I-,XEAFXEB 
I?I-AcB ’ 
x not free in I. 
His subset elimination rule is the typical use of the knowledge that A is a subset 
of B: 
l-l-fEA rI--AcB 
rI-fEB 
‘Sokolowski was using Edinburgh LCF, which lacks existential quantifiers. The same reasoning holds 
for universally quantified assumptions. 
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With these rules we can easily derive new rules, continuing to work at rule level. 
The proof tree 
- l?FACB 
r,xEAl-XEA l?,XEAFAcB TkBGC 
r,xEAi-XEB r,xEAtBcC 
T,xEAl-XEC 
l-t-AGC 
derives the rule 
I’I-AcB rl--BgC 
LCF has powerful mechanisms for deriving rules. For forwards proof, an inference 
rule is a function. A new rule is derived by composing functions. For backwards 
proof, an inference rule is a tactic. A new tactic is derived from other tactics using 
tacticals, operators designed for this purpose. The tactical THEN composes two 
tactics sequentially. The tactical REPEAT composes a tactic with itself repeatedly; 
it can make a proof tree of arbitrary height, depending on the goal. 
Yet LCF’S derived rules and tactics do not fully support reasoning about inference 
rules. In the logic PPX, variables range over individuals, not formulas or predicates. 
An induction scheme such as 
F A(O) A(+-A(n+l) 
kA(m) 
must be implemented by a complicated function or tactic that takes the formula A 
as an argument. Applying the function to some formula performs the derivation by 
executing all the primitive inferences. Execution can be slow, and can fail. The only 
way to inspect a derived rule or tactic is to test it: a function cannot be printed. 
One solution is Gordon’s higher-order logic [14]. A formula is simply a term of 
type bool; the theorem 
F VA.A(O) A (V’n.A(n) - A(n + 1)) * Vm.A(m) 
expresses the induction scheme. But such use of quantifiers and implication is 
precisely what Schmidt is trying to escape. So expressed, his subset introduction rule 
reverts to the axiom it was derived from: 
This approach could be used together with Monahan’s METARULE and 
METATAC. 
Isabelle’s solution is to work directly with inference rules, not theorems. Repre- 
sent inference rules as explicit syntactic structures, not functions. Formal proof 
consists of composing rules with each other; the resulting proof tree is a derived 
rule. This unifies the notions of forwards and backwards proof. 
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Backwards proof takes place by matching a goal with the conclusion of a rule; 
the premises become the subgoals. Consider the goal & (A A B) * (B A A). Match- 
ing it with the conclusion of the * -introduction rule gives the subgoal A A B & 
B A A. Somposing this with A -introduction gives two subgoals: A A B c B and 
A A B F- A. Composing these with the A -elimination rules gives two identical 
subgoals, A A B & A A B, which is an instance of the assumption rule. The proof 
tree is 
AABI-AAB AABI-AAB 
AABEB AABI-A 
AABI-BAA 
F(AAB)*(BAA) 
An inference rule is a scheme. It stands for the family of inferences obtained by 
uniformly substituting hypotheses for I’, formulas for A and B, terms for t, etc. A 
rule with no premises is an axiom scheme or theorem scheme. The example above 
proves the theorem scheme k (A A B) * (B A A). Forwards proof takes place by 
matching theorem schemes to the premises of a rule, making a new theorem scheme. 
Scheme variables may have as decisive an impact on LCF as they did on provers 
based on Herbrand’s theorem. The Davis-Putnam method generated ground clauses. 
Robinson’s resolution allowed variables in clauses, whereby one clause stood for an 
infinity of ground clauses [6, Chapter 51. Inference rules are Horn clauses; the 
composition of rules is resolution. A subtle difference: classical resolution is an 
inference rule for first-order logic; for sentences in clause form, no other inference 
rule is needed. For Isabelle, resolution builds proof trees from the inference rules of 
an arbitrary formal logic. 
5. FORMALIZING QUANTIFIER RULES 
Quantifiers cause enormous complications. Substitution and bound variables can be 
handled by representing logical syntax in the typed X-calculus. Skolemization can 
enforce parameter estrictions. 
5.1. Substitution and the Typed X-calculus . 
A expression of the X-calculus is a constant, a free variable X, a bound variable x, 
an abstraction hx. t, or a combination (tu). Free variables represent scheme vari- 
ables in rules, overlined for emphasis. 
Types, denoted by Greek letters (Y, j3,. . . , are recursively formed. There is a set of 
atomic types, and also function types (a + j3). Each expression has a type: 
Each variable and constant has one fixed type. 
If x has type (Y and t has type j3, then the abstraction hx.t has type (a + /3). 
If t has type (a + j3) and u has type (Y, then the combination (tu) has type j3. 
The usual abbreviations save writing needless parentheses. Let Xx1x2.. . x,. t 
abbreviate Xx,.Xx,. . . . .Xxn.t, and t( q, u2,. . . , uq) abbreviate ( * * - (( tu,)u,) . . . 
uq). Let q + q + . - . + p abbreviate ((Ye + (q + . + * + (tip + /3) . . . )). 
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Two X-expressions are equal if they can be made identical by a sequence of 
conversions: 
a-conversion is the renaming of a bound variable: Xx.t[x] = Xy.t[y]. 
p-conversion is substitution of an argument into the function body: (Xx.t[x])u = 
dul- 
v-conversion is extensionality of functions. If x is not free in t, and t has 
function type, then Xx.(tx) = t. 
For example, let us represent the syntax of propositional logic. Let term be the 
type of terms, and form the type of formulas. Connectives like conjunction and 
implication are infix constant symbols: let A and * have type form + form + form. 
A function represents a syntax rule: if A E form and B E form, then also A A B E 
f orm. 
All binding operators are represented using A. For the universal quantifier, 
introduce the constant II of type (term + form) + form. Let B be a function from 
terms to formulas: B E term -+ form. This simply means that B(t) is a formula for 
all terms t. The formula II(B) represents Vy. B( y). For example, Xx. R(x + 0, x) 
has type term + form. Applied to a term t - 3 it yields the formula R((t - 3) + 0, 
t - 3), while II(Xx.R(x + 0, x)) represents Vx.R(x + 0, x). 
Existential quantifiers can be treated as negated universals, or using another 
constant Z of type (term --j form) + form. As in Gordon’s HOL [13], a theorem 
prover can parse and print formulas in the usual notation. Quantifiers become 
II(B) only in the internal representation. 
Rec?!l the universal introduction rule: 
I-tA[x] 
IY-Vy.A[y]’ 
x not free in I. 
Write the quantified formula as II(B). Overline T and B: they are scheme variables, 
while the parameter x is not a scheme variable. The rule becomes 
FtB(x) 
THI(B)’ 
x not free in I, B 
The [. . . ] notation, for substitution, has become ( . . . ), for function application. 
There is a further restriction on x: it may not appear in B itself. The dependence of 
B(x) upon x must be purely function application. Otherwise there would be free 
occurrences of x in the conclusion. 
The V-elimination rule allows a universal theorem to be specialized to a term t. 
Conventional syntax: 
r F Vx.A[x] 
rI-A[t] 
Representation: 
T’tII(B) 
i?-B(i) . 
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The types term and form and the connective A are not part of the general 
framework; even the assertion sign F is just another constant. This representation 
of syntax is essentially Martin-LX’s theory of expressions [lo] extended to allow 
more than one atomic type. Church’s X-calculus representation of higher-order logic 
[13] is similar. Church allows quantification over any type, with a different II for 
each; its formalization in Isabelle is likely to resemble Martin-LXs II. The 
approach encompasses first-order and higher-order, constructive and classical ogics. 
5.2. Parameters and Skolemization 
Parameter restrictions are currently enforced by Skolemization, a representation 
resulting from (too much) trial and error. The end of this section describes a more 
natural approach that I intend to try. 
The V-introduction rule, even using the II representation, is not ready to be 
automated: it contains a parameter restriction. Apart from this restriction, the 
parameter name has no significance. The rule might as well specify a name that can 
never appear in B or P-neither now, nor later by instantiation of B and I. 
Extend the object syntax with a family of subscripted parameter symbols allr,B 
for all hypotheses I’ and formulas B. Now symbols and expressions are mutually 
recursive: I and B are part of the symbol all,, B. Clearly all,, B cannot appear in l? 
or B, since expressions are finitely constructed. The occurs check of unification 
enforces the restriction “not free in I, B.” Using the new parameters, V-introduc- 
tion becomes a pure Horn clause: 
r F B(aIlfi,J 
I;l- II(B) 
The 3-elimination rule also has parameter estrictions: 
It- W~[Yl r, A[X]I-c 
rtc 
7 x not free in r, C. 
Representing the quantifier using Z gives 
Tt-Z(B) 
-- 
r, B(x) I- c --- 
Ttc 
3 x not free in r, B, C. 
Decorating the parameter exi with the expressions it must not occur in gives 
i?@) 
-- 
I, B(exir,B,c) F c 
rtc 
Schmidt also suggests natural deduction rules using Skolemization [35]. He tags a 
parameter with free variables rather than with entire expressions. 
Perhaps all should not include the hypothesis, the subscript r. The simpler and 
more efficient rule 
T; I- B(all,) 
rl- II(B) 
resembles Robinson’s [33]. His logic includes exemplification terms, a version of 
Hilbert’s e-operator. The rule allows all, to appear in the hypotheses I. It is sound 
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with respect to models that assign all, a value y, if such exists, to make B(y) false. 
If B(al1,) is true, then so is II(B). 
Thus the symbol all,, B can be understood syntactically as a way of choosing a 
name, or semantically as a choice function. An alternative is the function appli- 
cation all(I+, B), with all (now a function symbol) and all(r) as subexpressions. In 
an experiment, such subexpressions grossly expanded the search space in higher-order 
unification. 
Many people object to Skolemization. In a real proof, where r and B are large 
expressions, printing all r, B requires exponential space on the page. Isabelle has an 
algorithm for compressing Skolem names to unique identifiers, but this works only 
for printing, not input. A derived rule, like subset introduction, may contain an 
unnatural Skolem parameter consisting of the Skolem parameters of its derivation. 
Unique names can be generated by numbering (Lisp’s GENSYM). But this alone does 
not prevent the parameter from sneaking into r or B by later instantiation. 
Lincoln Wallen tells me that an acyclic graph could enforce the parameter 
restrictions. The rule 
r I- Ii(x) -- 
TtrI(B)’ 
x not free in r, B, 
could be represented as a Horn clause together with a tiny graph: the parameter x 
would point to r and B. Instantiation of variables in r and B would extend the 
graph. During resolution of two rules, their graphs would be merged. The occurs 
check would follow edges leading from parameters, preventing the introduction of 
cycles. Resolution requires scheme variables to be standardized apart: renamed to 
avoid clashes with variables in the other rule. The parameter names would also be 
standardized apart, preserving their uniqueness. 
Wallen [39] applies his technique to first-order logic and a modal logic. Miller 
[23] describes a similar technique in the setting of higher-order logic. 
6. HIGHER-ORDER UNIFICATION 
Unifying two expressions t and u means solving the syntactic equation t = u by 
instantiating some of its variables. For ordinary unification, expressions are recur- 
sively built up from variables X and function applications F(t,, . . . , tJ. Two 
expressions are equal only if they are identical. Expressions and variables are 
untyped. There are practical algorithms for computing the most general unifier of 
two expressions, or reporting that no unifier exists. 
Higher-order unification amounts to solving equations in the typed X-calculus 
with respect to (Y, p, and possibly q-conversion [17, 191. It is semidecidable: if the 
expressions cannot be unified, the search for unifiers may diverge. Although a 
complete set of unifiers can be recursively enumerated, it may be intimte. Unifying 
the expression f(Y) with the constant A gives the two unifiers {f= Xy.A} and 
{f=Ay.y, F=A}. If A, B i, . . . , B4 are distinct constants, then unifying J(X) with 
A(B I,“‘, B,) gives q + 2 unifiers: 
{i=%@,,...,B,)}, 
{ f=Ay.y, Z=A(B, ,..., B,)}, 
{ f=Ay.A(B, ,..., Bi-1, _v, Bi+l,*.., B4), x=Bi}, i=l 7.e.7 4. 
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Unifying f(T,, X2) with A(B,, . . . , B,) gives q2 + q + 3 unifiers. Too many variables 
make the search space explode. 
For representing first-order logic, second-order expressions suffice: no function 
variable need have functions as arguments. Marek Zaionc [40] gives a third-order 
example: the expressions f(hx.x) and A have the infinite set of unifiers 
{f=G.A}, { f= Q.Y(A)) 3 {f=Ay.y(y(A))}, andsoon. 
6. I. Huet’s Search Procedure 
Most implementations use Huet’s procedures SIMPL and MATCH [17]. SIMPL essen- 
tially does first-order unification. Each expression is put into head normal form: 
XX 1”’ X”.&..., $J, 
where F is a constant, free variable, or bound variable. Such an expression is called 
rigid if F is a constant or a bound variable, and flexible if F is a free variable. 
Outermost lambdas are stripped off, the bound variables x1,. . . , x, become 
part of the context, behaving much like constants. The input pair of expressions is 
broken into a set of disagreement pairs to be unified. A rigid-rigid pair 
(F(t 1,. . . , t,), F(u,, . . . , u,)) is simplified to the set of pairs (tlr q), . . . , (tq, uq). If 
F# G then (F(t, ,..., t,),G(u, ,..., u,)) is recognized as nonunifiable. 
A pair (X, t) has the most general unifier { X = t } if X does not occur in t. MATCH 
can find this unifier, but it is more efficient if SIMPL instantiates X immediately. 
Function variables complicate the occurs check: X and j(X) are unified by both 
{f= Xy.X} and {J= Xy.y}. Huet’s rigid path occurs check gives a practical 
sufficient condition for X and t to be unifiable while detecting some nonunifiable 
cases. Some cases cannot be easily classified as unifiable or not; the implementor 
must decide whether an expensive search or a missed unifier is the lesser evil. 
MATCH guesses instantiations of variables, usually function variables. A flex-rigid 
pair 
(i( t,,..., t,)J(u,,...,u,)) 
gives rise to as many as p + 1 different substitutions for f. For i = 1,2,. . . , let 
h;(x 1,. . . , xp) be a new variable of appropriate type. We have 
f=Ax,... Xp.Xi(hl(X1 )...) x,) )...) X,(x, )...) x,)) for certain i, by projection ; 
f= Ax,. . . xp.F(h,(x, ,..., x,) ,..., h&x, ,..., x,)) by imitation. 
Imitation applies whenever F is a constant, not a bound variable. Projection applies 
for those i such-that the type of xi allows m to be chosen to give J the correct type. 
If the type of f is (Ye -+ * . . + ap + j3, then (Y~ must be y1 + . . . + y,,, + p. The 
second-order case is simpler; the projections are 
f=hx,...x,.x, 
for those i such that the argument type equals the result type, (Y~ = /?. 
MATCH gives a choice of substitutions, creating an OR tree. One of these 
substitutions is chosen and applied to all the disagreement pairs, and the search 
contic.;es. SIMPL immediately rejects a projection if ti begins with a constant 
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different from F, imitation reduces the disagreement pair to the pairs 
( ( $1 t,, . . ., tp), UJ,. . ., (h,( t,, . . .) tp), uq). 
Sometimes both expressions begin with a free variable, the jex-Jlex case. Uni- 
fying f(t,, . . . , tp) with S( ur, . . . , uq) yields an explosion of counterintuitive solu- 
tions [19]. Huet’s algorithm reports success when only flex-flex pairs remain: there is 
a trivial unifier 
{f=xx l...Xp.h, jf=Xy,...y,.h}. 
Since the trivial unifier throws away too much information, a theorem prover should 
store the flex-flex pairs as constraints on future unifications. 
6.2. Discussion 
Here is an example: unifying f(C, X) with A(B), where A, B, and C are distinct 
constants. SIMPL returns (f(C, X), A(B)). MATCH guesses three instantiations for f: 
J= Ayt. y, by projection: SIMPL finds (C, A(B)), a failure node. 
J= Ayz.z, by projection: SIMPL instantiates X and returns success, the unifier 
{f=Xyz.z, x=/l(B)}. 
f= Ayz.A(g(y, z)), by imitation: SIMPL returns (g(C, x), B). MATCH guesses 
three instantiations for g: 
g = Xyz. y, by projection: SIMPL finds (C, B), a failure node. 
g = Xyz.z, by projection: SIMPL instantiates X and returns success, the unifier 
{f=Ayz.A(z), X= B}. 
g = Xyz. B, by imitation: SIMPL returns success, { f= Xyz.A( B)}. 
This search terminated with three unifiers. For an exercise, work through Zaionc’s 
example. The original disagreement pair soon recurs in the search tree, giving an 
infinite set of unifiers. 
Higher-order unification is effective if we use function variables with care. Most 
disagreement pairs are simple assignments X = t; even assignments of function 
variables are easy. Solving a recursive equation like f(t) = u(f) is hard, often 
causing the search to diverge. Although the nonrecursive equation f(t,, . . . , rp) = u 
has the trivial solution { f= Ax,. . . x,.u}, finding its interesting solutions requires 
the full search. There are many different ways of projecting onto the arguments 
t,, . . . , t, or imitating parts of u. 
For example, the equation f(0) = 0 + 0 has four solutions in f: Xx.x + x, 
hx.x + 0, Xx.0 + x, and Ax.0 + 0. The first solution is the most natural; the second 
and third are sometimes useful. The last solution, produced by pure imitation, is 
only rarely useful. MATCH should try projection before imitation, to produce the 
trivial solution last. 
Are types essential? Logic programming traditionally uses no types. Higher-order 
unification makes sense for a single atomic type data containing integers, booleans, 
strings, and, recursively, tuples of data. But function types must be distinguished 
from atomic types. In the untyped A-calculus, it is undecidable whether an expres- 
sion has a normal form, so SIMPL could diverge. Worse, there is a fixedpoint 
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combinator Y such that Y( f ) =f( Y(f)) f or all expressions f. This solves any 
disagreement pair in MATCH: f(t) = u( f ) has the trivial solution { f = Y( Afx. u( f ))}. 
Huet gives a version of MATCH for unification without q-conversion [17]. The 
search space expands: f need not equal Xx.f(x), so many more independent 
substitutions are possible. These contribute nothing even in a logic with intensional 
functions, provided that A-abstraction is only used as the syntactic representation of 
binding operators. 
Theorem proving is undecidable, but it is unfortunate that each resolution step is 
undecidable. We can recover decidability by restricting unification. Limiting the 
search gives unpredictable results. Second-order matching is decidable [18], though 
second-order unification is not [ll]. Perhaps first-order unification plus second-order 
matching is a practical compromise. Ketonen’s EKL proves theorems using first-order 
unification plus higher-order matching. Ketonen claims that higher-order matching 
is decidable, without proof [20]; Huet tells me that decidability is an open question. 
Quantifiers go beyond first-order unification, but where do we stop? LCF in- 
ference rules form the union of hypotheses: 
Must unification must also handle union, an associative, commutative, and idempo- 
tent operator? Fortunately, a different treatment of assumptions is possible: 
I;t-A I;l-B 
I;cAr\B - 
Unification cannot do everything. 
7. THE IMPLEMENTATION 
Isabelle consists of 3200 lines of the new Standard ML [26], compiled by David 
Matthews’s PO~Y/ML on a VAX/750 running Berkeley Unix. Both the language and 
Matthews’s compiler have been assets. Type checking means that sophisticated code 
often works first time. Compiled code runs fast: examples with dozens of higher-order 
unifications run in seconds. 
For the typed A-calculus, the ML type arity represents types, and the ML type 
term represents X-expressions. Scheme variables are represented by (string, integer) 
pairs. Each bound variable is also represented by an integer, referring to the depth 
at which it is bound [4]. The environment primitives use Boyer and Moore’s 
structure sharing [3] to standardize variables apart before unification. Normalization, 
a-convertability, and substitution functions are provided. The X-expression parser 
and printer are extensible. Each can be invoked in mutual recursion with 
parsing/printing functions written for a particular logical syntax. 
Higher-order unification returns a possibly infinite stream of unifiers. Streams are 
implemented as usual: each member contains a function for computing the rest of 
the stream. The occurs check is slow: each assignment X = t requires scanning t for 
X. Omitted in PROLOG, the occurs check is essential for enforcing parameter 
restrictions. Large expressions, representing assumption lists, must be scanned. 
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The type rule and the function Resolve provide the basic inference mechanism. 
In backwards proof, the goal tree is a rule 
QI--.Q, 
P . 
The root P is the initial goal; 
the leaves Q, . . . Q, are the unanalysed subgoals. Resolving a subgoal with a rule 
produces a new goal tree. At present, Isabelle does not store the tree of resolution 
steps underlying a rule; as a result, a goal tree has no internal subgoal structure. 
An Isabelle tactic is a function on inference rules, regarded as goal trees. It has 
type rule + (rule stream): it may return a stream of trees. A tactic for goal-directed 
proof just replaces some leaves, but any function on goal trees is a tactic. RulesTac 
unifies the conclusion of several rules against a goal. There are two levels of choice: 
several rules may apply; a rule may have several unifiers with the goal. The tactical 
DEPTH FIRST repeatedly applies a tactic in depth-first search. If the tactic 
returns arr empty stream of goal trees, then the goal is abandoned. Sokolowski used 
depth-first search for backwards chaining along hypotheses [37]. It is also effective 
with introduction rules. Together with RulesTac it constitutes a higher-order 
PROLOG interpreter. It can execute trivial PROLOG programs (slowly). 
The interactive goal package maintains the current proof state. When applying a 
tactic, the package uses the first set of subgoals produced, saving the remainder of 
the stream. The user can explicitly backtrack any past step: discard the current goal 
tree, taking the next tree from that point. The backtrack command fails if the 
stream for that step is empty. 
In the original goal, scheme variables are useful placeholders for information that 
is irrelevant or unknown. New variables crop up as existential witnesses. During the 
proof, scheme variables develop gradually and naturally. A variable may occur in 
more than one goal; instantiation affects all goals simultaneously. 
To minimize backtracking, goals must be tackled in a sensible order. A variable 
in a critical place leaves the search unconstrained; a goal is too flexible if its 
variables allow too many rules to unify. Experimental depth-first tacticals con- 
trol the search by expanding only “appropriate” goals. One argument of 
DEPTH FIRST is a predicate for classifying a goal as satisfied or unsatisfied. One 
argument of DepthRulesFunTac is a function for analysing a goal, computing the 
list of appropriate rules. The function can defer a goal by returning an empty rule 
list. Deferred goals can be reconsidered as the search proceeds; the search stops 
when all remaining goals continue to be deferred. A goal can be deferred for any 
reason, not just if too flexible. A typical application would be to conduct a proof in 
stages: solving all equational goals, while leaving the others until later. 
8. EXPERIMENTS WITH CONSTRUCTIVE TYPE THEORY 
Isabelle has been set up for Martin-LX s constructive type theory, with a parser and 
printer for its syntax, and tactics for solving typical problems. This thirty percent of 
the code is kept separate from the rest. 
8.1. Constructive Type Theory 
Martin-Liifs type theory is an attempt to formalize constructive reasoning [21, 291. 
It interprets propositions as types: the rules for each logical connective express its 
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constructive meaning as operations on proof objects, elements of the corresponding 
type. For instance, the proposition A A B is interpreted as the Cartesian product 
A X B: a proof of A A B is a pair (a, b), where a is a proof of A and b is a proof of 
B. The proof objects form a simple functional programming language. All computa- 
tions terminate, though the set of functions is much larger than the set of primitive 
recursive functions. 
People are using constructive type theory for program verification and derivation. 
By “propositions as types,” a small family of primitives provides a full system of 
logical connectives, data structures, and programs. A type can express a complete 
formal specification: the type of a sorting function can assert that its output is a 
sorted permutation of its input. Petersson has implemented type theory by modify- 
ing Edinburgh LCF [32]. PRL supports a related type theory using ideas from LCF [9]. 
Type theory has several kinds of rules: 
Formation rules build types from other types. 
Introduction rules build elements of types. By “propositions as types,” they also 
introduce logical connectives. 
Elimination rules specify control structures, called selectors, for each type: 
discrimination for sum types, projections for product types, application for 
function types, and primitive recursion for recursive types. By “propositions 
as types,” they also eliminate logical connectives. 
Equality rules give the result of evaluating expressions. 
8.2. Functions and the Theory of Expressions 
A higher-order syntax is practically essential. While predicate calculus has only two 
binding operators, V and 3, type theory has II, Z, split, when, etc., with various 
binding rules. Martin-L% s theory of expressions [lo] is formally equivalent to the 
typed h-calculus with the single ground type 0. The notation and terminology are 
different, especially for types. Martin-L6f uses the word arity, reserving type for the 
types described by the inference rules. Let us adopt this convention for now. 
There are two sets of notation because there are two kinds of function: the arity 
(Y -+ p and the (Martin-Lijf) type A * B. If A and B are types, then A 2 B is the 
type of functions from A to B, and corresponds to logical implication. Call an 
expression of arity (Y + /I a function, and an element of type A - B a function 
object. An expression of function arity is also called unsaturated, while an expression 
of atomic arity is called saturated. These concepts are due to Gottlob Frege [l]. 
Functions play important roles in the rules, but only saturated expressions can 
denote types or elements of types: a single expression cannot be both a function and 
a function object. 
Consider the function Xxy.R(x + y, x). Martin-LBf writes this as (x, y)R(x + 
y, x), reserving X for function objects. I find this hard to read, preferring the 
traditional X-notation, or X(x, y)R(x + y, x) as a compromise. I use lambda for 
abstraction of function objects. If b is a function, then its extension is 
lambda(x a function object. There are also two forms of application: for 
functions, b(r); for function objects, f * t or apply( f, t). The type-theory rule for 
&conversion defines application of function objects in terms of application of 
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functions: (lambda(x) t = b(t). The q-conversion rule is lamhda(x)(c * x) = c. 
These rules are needed even though the syntactic theory has both p and 17 
conversion. 
The distinction between functions and function objects is not just for type theory. 
There will be other logics whose notion of function cannot be identified with the 
X-calculus functions. The X-calculus representation does not prejudice the notion of 
function in the logic. 
8.3. The Rules on the Computer 
The theorems of type theory are called judgements. A judgement of the form A type 
means that- A is a type, while a E A means that a is an element of type A. A 
judgement can have assumptions, an ordered list x1 E A,, . . . , x, E A,,. Using an 
assumption u E A means searching down the list for a, then verifying that A is a 
type. The Isabelle rules use the PROLOG style of list processing: 
rl-Atype S~a=A 
1;, CEAI-ZEA’ 
-- 
I’,bE%iiEA’ 
The product introduction rule is handled like V-introduction. First of all, 
Martin-Lof uses the binding operator Il for product types. The type lYIY E AB( v) 
corresponds to the proposition Vy E A.B(y). Elements of the type are function 
objects. The rule is written 
IFAitype ~,xEAI-Bob 
r k lambda( E n,,,B(y) ’ 
x not free in r. 
In the A-calculus syntactic representation, the binding operators II and lambda 
are used as constant symbols. The representation of rIY E aB(y) is II(A, B); the 
representation of lambda(x) b( x) is lambda(b). Then making scheme variables 
explicit gives 
rtAtype T,xEAl-$(X)EB(X) -- - 
-- 
Tk-lambda(b)EII(A,B) ’ 
x not free in F, b, B. 
Using the Skolem constant priT,h, B, for product introduction, gives 
?;t-Atype r,pri-,.,.BEA~-(pri~.h.B)EB(pri~.g,B) 
-- 
T I- lambda(b) E lII( A, B) 
In Isabelle, the type-theory parser, reud_rule, is called from ML. The premises are an 
ML list of strings; each variable is indicated by a prefixed question mark; Skolem 
subscripts are in square brackets: 
val ProdIntrRl =read_ruLe 
cc "?H I- ?A type", 
"?H, priC?bl,?Bll: ?A I- ?bl(priC?bl,?Bll) : 
?Bl(priC?bl,?B1l)" 1, 
x ____________________~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~-~~~~ 1 
"?H I- lambda(?bl) : Prod(?A,?Bl)" 1; 
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The horizontal line is simply an ML comment. Omitting the subscript r (ASCII 
syntax ?H) is an old mistake that I have not gotten round to fixing, since there are a 
dozen similar rules. 
8.4. Tactics 
Tactics, built from standard primitives, can solve problems expressed in type theory. 
Checking that a type A is well formed takes place by using formation rules to prove 
the judgement A type. 
By unification, a rule can specify more than one direction of information flow. In 
PROLOG this is called multimode execution: programs can run backwards. The 
judgement a E A has several meanings: 
can mean u is a program of type A. Given a program a, proving a E x 
determines the type of a. Type inference comes for free, while Gothenburg’s 
type theory system [32] directly implements Milner’s algorithm, a lot of code 
using explicit unification [25]. A group at INRIA also obtain the effect of 
Milner’s algorithm by executing inference rules [7]. 
can mean a is a proof of the proposition A. Given a proposition A, proving 
?i E A gives a constructive proof of A. While this is undecidable, repeated use 
of introduction rules performs a large portion of the proof. 
can mean a is a program with specification A. Given a specification A, 
proving Z E A amounts to the program synthesis of Z 
The tactic DepthIntrTuc uses DepthRulesFunTuc to handle variables sensibly in 
the formation and introduction rules. The goal A type is deferred if A is a variable. 
For u E A either a or A must not be a variable. TypeCheckTuc is similar but uses 
elimination rules as well as formation and introduction rules. For u E A it requires a 
to be rigid, since if a is a variable then all the elimination rules apply. TypeCheck- 
Tat handles the typechecking problems that have come up in my experiments. It 
can check the type of the addition operator, as defined by primitive recursion. 
Solving the goal 
lambda(k)lambda(m)rec(m, X(x, y)succ(y), k) ~2 
assigns A= Nat - Nat * Nat. 
A type-theory function takes apart its arguments using the awkward selector 
operators. An ML function is defined by equations on its patterns of input. To 
support a pattern-directed style for type theory, I have experimented with tactics for 
manipulating equations. Some examples go through with little guidance. For the 
predecessor-function the tactics discover that pred = lambda{ x)rec( x, A( y, z) y, x) 
with type A = Nat - Nat by solving the goal 
xE .rL( pred*O=OX xGQatpred*succ(k)=k). 
The function fst, on product types, takes the first component of a pair (a, b). The 
tactics discover that fst = lambda(x)split( A( y, z) y, x) with type A= (Nat X Nat) * 
Nat: 
XE C n n fst*(i,j)=i. 
f,tcxieNat jcNat 
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This example involves both product and sum types. The tactics discover a 
binding for f using the selectors when and split: 
Such use of function variables can cause unification problems. An arithmetic 
addition function can be discovered, but addition as a function object of type 
Nat * Nat = Nat performs computation 
derivation produces subgoals containing 
tion diverges. 
9. RELATED WORK 
The earliest applications of higher-order 
on both numbers and function types.. Its 
unsimplified recursion equations; unifica- 
unification extended resolution to higher- 
order logic [19]. Huet’s constrained resolution postponed branching in unification 
[16]. Rather than returning multiple unifiers in a resolution step, it recorded the 
remaining disagreement pairs as constraints on the new clause. Further resolutions 
satisfied the constraints or rendered them clearly nonunifiable. Constrained resolu- 
tion went beyond using only flex-flex disagreement pairs, which are always unifiable, 
as constraints. 
The TPS theorem prover uses sophisticated heuristics in the search for higher-order 
unifiers [24]. In MATCH it chooses a disagreement pair likely to cause the least 
branching of the tree. It hashes disagreement sets to determine whether a new set is 
subsumed by an older one. Though the subsumption test is expensive, it cuts the 
search space substantially and prevents some searches from diverging. TPS uses 
general matings rather than resolution. The mating approach unifies subformulas 
against each other without reducing everything to clause form. TPS can automati- 
cally prove Cantor’s theorem: every set has more subsets than elements [2]. 
Unification discovers the diagonalization function. 
The EKL proof checker uses higher-order matching of rewrite rules [20]. N. G. 
de Bruijn’s AUTOMATH project has investigated several higher-order h-calculi, remi- 
niscent of Martin-Lijfs type theory, as languages for machine-checked proof [5]. 
Huet and Coquand’s theory of constructions i a natural development from AUTOMATH 
[8]. Gordon’s HOL is a version of LCF for proving theorems in Church’s higher-order 
logic [13]. The logics of HOL, EKL, and TPS are all descended from Church’s. 
Gilles Kahn and his group execute operational semantics expressed as inference 
rules. The rules are preprocessed, then translated into PROLOG. They have 
considered the dynamic semantics of several simple languages, and ML type-check- 
ing [7]. The system runs inside the structure editor Mentor, providing type-checking 
and execution of the program being edited. 
10. FUTURE 
Though Isabelle can handle small examples, much work remains before interesting 
proofs can be attempted. 
QuantiJers have been the number one trouble spot. A list of failed approaches 
would fill the page. Skolem constants work but are clumsy. I hope that the acyclic 
dependency graph will work. 
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LCF's simplifier uses equations as rewrite rules. Proving (i +j) + k = i + ( j + k) 
should be trivial: use induction on i, then simplify the base and step subgoals. 
Without a simplifier, this is impossibly tedious. LCF ideas may need drastic change 
because of unification. 
Higher-order unijkation behaves well if not provoked by unreasonable use of 
function variables. Most of the time first-order unification takes place, so Isabelle 
does not require the TPS subsumption test. Decidable restrictions of unification 
should be found. 
An LCF theory is a data base of constants, types, axioms, and theorems. At 
present, Isabelle allows only simple abbreviations. We need methods for combining 
theories and working in different logics. 
The user interface is crude. In LCF, the logic is integrated with ML; in Isabelle, the 
parser and printer must be invoked. Goals are designated by number; a high-resolu- 
tion display and mouse would help. 
Other logics must be considered to test whether Isabelle is really general. One 
candidate is the logical theory [lo], a first-order intuitionistic logic in which type 
theory can be constructed. Something radically different, like a Hoare logic or a 
temporal logic, should be attempted. 
David Matthews has worked hard on his Standard ML compiler, with funding from the Science and 
Engineering Research Council. The main ideas came from the work of Gerard Huet, Per Martin-Liif, and 
Stefan Sokolowski. Lincoln Wallen suggested a promising alternative to Skolemization. Gilles Kahn’s 
group demonstrated related work. Thanks also to Peter Aczel, Peter Andrews, Michael Gordon, Dale 
Miller, Bengt Nordstrsm, Kent Petersson, Frank Pfenning, Alan Robinson, Jan M. Smith, and Richard 
Waldinger. 
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